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dc.contributor.authorEllman, Matthew-
dc.contributor.authorHurkens, Sjaak-
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-25T13:31:57Z-
dc.date.available2020-02-25T13:31:57Z-
dc.date.issued2019-11-
dc.identifierdoi: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104939-
dc.identifierissn: 1095-7235-
dc.identifierissn: 0022-0531-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory 184: 104939 (2019)-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/201925-
dc.description.abstractThis paper characterizes profit- and welfare-maximizing reward-based crowdfunding, defined by an aggregate funding threshold for production. We disentangle crowdfunding's selling and funding roles, locating its key benefit in its market test role of adapting production to demand. Multiple prices prove necessary for effective learning and adaptation, even with relatively large crowds. Mechanism design proves general optimality in our baseline and shows the value of limiting reward quantities. Funding is not fundamental and crowdfunding may even complement traditional finance. We characterize welfare consequences, model price dynamics and identify platform designs and regulations that enhance innovation and social benefits.-
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from the 2016 FBBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”, the Net Institute grant 14-21 (www.Netinst.org), the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), Spanish ministerial grants (ECO2017-88129-P (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE), Ellman, and PGC2018-097898-B-100 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE), Hurkens) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2017 SGR 1136) is gratefully acknowledged.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherElsevier BV-
dc.relationMINECO/ICTI2013-2016/SEV-2015-0563-
dc.relationPGC2018-097898-B-100/AEI/10.13039/501100011033-
dc.relationPGC2018-097898-B-100/AEI/10.13039/501100011033-
dc.relationECO2017-88129-P/AEI/10.13039/501100011033-
dc.relationMICIU/ICTI2017-2020/ECO2017-88129-P-
dc.relationMICIU/ICTI2017-2020/PGC2018-097898-B-100-
dc.relationMICIU/ICTI2017-2020/PGC2018-097898-B-100-
dc.relation.isversionofPostprint-
dc.rightsopenAccessen_EN
dc.subjectCrowdfunding-
dc.subjectMechanism design-
dc.subjectEntrepreneurial finance-
dc.subjectMarket-testing-
dc.subjectAdaptation-
dc.subjectRent-extraction-
dc.titleOptimal crowdfunding design-
dc.typeartículo-
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104939-
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104939-
dc.date.updated2020-02-25T13:31:57Z-
dc.contributor.funderAgencia Estatal de Investigación (España)-
dc.contributor.funderFundación BBVA-
dc.contributor.funderAgencia Estatal de Investigación (España)-
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)-
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)-
dc.contributor.funderEuropean Commission-
dc.contributor.funderGeneralitat de Catalunya-
dc.relation.csic-
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000780es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000780es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100011033es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100011033es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100007406es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100007406es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002809es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002809es_ES
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