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Título : Delegated Bargaining And Renegotiation
Autor : Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József
Palabras clave : Bargaining
Commitment
Delegation
Renegotiation
Fecha de publicación : dic-1998
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
440.99
Resumen: This paper examines the commitment e ect of delegated bargain- ing when renegotiation of the delegation contract cannot be ruled out. We consider a seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a prospective buyer or hire an intermediary to bargain on her behalf. The intermediary is able to interrupt his negotiation with the buyer to renegotiate the delegation contract. In this model, the time cost of renegotiation prevents a full elimination of the commitment e ect of delegation. In particular, there are always gains from delegation when the players are su ciently patient. An extension of the basic model to a search market shows that the gains from delegation are negatively related to the e ciency of search.
Descripción : Trabajo publicado como artículo en Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 45(4): 459-473 (2001).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00157-3
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1966
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