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Title

Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: The Design Of Financial Claims

AuthorsCestone, Giacinta; White, Lucy
KeywordsCoase Problem
Over-funding
Venture Capital
Convertible Debt
Issue Date6-Apr-2000
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
453.00
AbstractThis paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. In standard models of the interaction between product and financial markets, a firm’s use of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior, whereas in our model entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms. We find that in order to deter entry, the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky, i.e. equity, in contrast to the standard Brander-Lewis (1986) result that debt deters entry. The model sheds light on the policy debate on the separation of banking as to whether banks should be permitted to hold equity in firms. It also provides an explanation for why venture capitalists hold automatically convertible securities in start-up firms.
DescriptionPublished in The Journal of Finance, Vol. LVIII, no. 5, October 2003, URI: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1540-6261.00599.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1965
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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