Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
logo share SHARE BASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE

Invite to open peer review

Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: The Design Of Financial Claims

AuthorsCestone, Giacinta; White, Lucy
KeywordsCoase Problem
Venture Capital
Convertible Debt
Issue Date6-Apr-2000
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
AbstractThis paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. In standard models of the interaction between product and financial markets, a firm’s use of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior, whereas in our model entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms. We find that in order to deter entry, the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky, i.e. equity, in contrast to the standard Brander-Lewis (1986) result that debt deters entry. The model sheds light on the policy debate on the separation of banking as to whether banks should be permitted to hold equity in firms. It also provides an explanation for why venture capitalists hold automatically convertible securities in start-up firms.
DescriptionPublished in The Journal of Finance, Vol. LVIII, no. 5, October 2003, URI:
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
45300.pdf307,63 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record

CORE Recommender

Page view(s)

checked on May 23, 2024


checked on May 23, 2024

Google ScholarTM


WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.