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Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem

AutorMassó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
Palabras claveDivision problem
Fecha de publicaciónmar-1999
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
434.99
ResumenThe consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1955
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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