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Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value

AuthorsPérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
KeywordsShapley value
Simple mechanism
Coalition formation
Issue DateJun-2000
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
AbstractWe propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment.
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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