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Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1952
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Título : Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value
Autor : Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
Palabras clave : Shapley value
Implementation
Simple mechanism
Coalition formation
Fecha de publicación : jun-2000
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
461.00
Resumen: We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1952
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