Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1949
COMPARTIR / EXPORTAR:
SHARE BASE | |
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE | |
Título: | Self-Selection Consistent Functions |
Autor: | Beviá, Carmen; Barberà, Salvador | Palabras clave: | Consistency Condorcet criterion |
Fecha de publicación: | nov-2000 | Serie: | UFAE and IAE Working Papers 468.00 |
Resumen: | This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1949 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|---|
46800.pdf | 1,97 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
CORE Recommender
Page view(s)
348
checked on 23-abr-2024
Download(s)
204
checked on 23-abr-2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.