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Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1949
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Título

Self-Selection Consistent Functions

AutorBeviá, Carmen; Barberà, Salvador
Palabras claveConsistency
Condorcet criterion
Fecha de publicaciónnov-2000
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
468.00
ResumenThis paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1949
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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