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Título

Stable Condorcet Rules

AutorBeviá, Carmen; Barberà, Salvador
Palabras claveSocial Choice Correspondences
Condorcet Rules
Stability
Simpson Rule
Fecha de publicaciónsep-2002
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
539.02
ResumenWe consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1943
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