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Title

A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

AuthorsPérez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda
KeywordsMatching model
Assignment model
Mechanisms
Implementation
Issue Date1-Aug-2000
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
421.98
AbstractFor the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any, among the remaining objects. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies. That is, the mechanism leads to the maximum equilibrium prices and to an optimal matching.
DescriptionPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0704.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1938
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo




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