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dc.contributor.authorBrandts, Jordi-
dc.contributor.authorCharness, Gary-
dc.date.accessioned2007-11-06T13:08:17Z-
dc.date.available2007-11-06T13:08:17Z-
dc.date.issued1998-08-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1936-
dc.description.abstractIn experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player responds to the first player’s observed action while in our “cold” treatment we follow the “strategy method” and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others’ actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects’ preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support for this project was provided by the Spanish DGCICYT (PB93-0679 and PB94-0663-CO3-01) and the Spanish Ministry Education grant D101-7715.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUFAE and IAE Working Papersen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries424.98en_US
dc.rightsopenAccessen_US
dc.subjectStrategy methoden_US
dc.subjectExperimenten_US
dc.subjectPreference stabilityen_US
dc.subjectSequential responsesen_US
dc.subjectLeexen_US
dc.titleHot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Gamesen_US
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoen_US
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