English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1903
COMPARTIR / IMPACTO:
Estadísticas
logo share SHARE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:
Título

Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments

AutorMutuswami, Suresh; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
Palabras claveBidding
Implementation
Networks
Public goods
Fecha de publicación26-feb-2001
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
479.01
ResumenIn this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1903
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
47901.pdf211,37 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.