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Title

Voting by Committees under Constraints

AuthorsBarberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
KeywordsVoting
Strategy-proofness
Additive and Separable Preferences
Issue Date23-Oct-2001
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
501.01
AbstractWe consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1901
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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