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The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study

AutorAragonés, Enriqueta ; Palfrey, Thomas R.
Palabras claveCandidate quality
Experiments
Spatial competition
Quantal response equilibrium
Fecha de publicación1-jun-2002
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
530.02
ResumenWhen two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.
DescripciónTrabajo publicado como artículo en American Political Science Review 98(1): 77-90 (2004).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001017
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1891
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