Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1887
Share/Export:
logo share SHARE BASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE
Title

Stakeholder Activism, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Congruence of Interests between Shareholders and Stakeholders

AuthorsCespa, Giovanni; Cestone, Giacinta
KeywordsCorporate governance
Managerial entrenchment
Social activists
Small shareholders
Stakeholder society
Issue Date21-Jul-2002
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
528.02
AbstractWe argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other's agendas.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1887
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo




Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
52802.pdf236,02 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show full item record
Review this work

Page view(s)

303
checked on Feb 29, 2024

Download(s)

233
checked on Feb 29, 2024

Google ScholarTM

Check


WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.