English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1884
Share/Impact:
Statistics
logo share SHARE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:

Title

A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem

AuthorsMassó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
KeywordsStrategy-proofness
Single-plateaued preferences
Issue Date13-Sep-2002
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
535.02
AbstractThe division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1884
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
53502.pdf303,71 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show full item record
Review this work
 


WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.