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Título

24

AutorAbbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi
Palabras claveLaboratory experiments
Industrial organisation
Oligopoly
Price competition
Co-ordination games
Learning
Fecha de publicación1-jul-2002
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
523.02
ResumenWe study the relation between the number of firms and market power in experimental oligopolies. Price competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy equilibrium prices. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. Less collusion with more firms leads to lower average prices. With more than two firms, the predominant market price is 24. A simple imitation model captures this phenomenon. For the long run, the model predicts that prices converge to the Walrasian outcome, but for the intermediate term the modal price is 24
DescripciónTrabajo publicado en Games and Economic Behavior 63(1): 1- 31 (2008) con el titulo 24. Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs.-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.007
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1878
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