English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1868
Compartir / Impacto:
Estadísticas
Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Ver citas en Google académico
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar otros formatos: Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)
Título : On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching
Autor : Martínez-Giralt, Xavier; Nicolini, Rosella
Palabras clave : Bertrand competition
Duopoly
Learning
Firm agreements
Fecha de publicación : 30-oct-2002
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
548.02
Resumen: This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1868
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
54802.pdf145,81 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.