English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1834
Compartir / Impacto:
Estadísticas
Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Ver citas en Google académico
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar otros formatos: Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)
Título : Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem
Autor : Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
Palabras clave : Bribe-proofness
Strategy-proofness
Efficiency
Replacement Monotonicity
Single-peakedness
Fecha de publicación : 7-may-2003
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
571.03
Resumen: The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1834
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
57103.pdf272,91 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.