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Título : Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring
Autor : Socorro, M. Pilar
Palabras clave : RJV
Moral hazard
Adverse selection
Subsidies
Monitoring
Fecha de publicación : 2-may-2003
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
570.03
Resumen: We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1832
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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