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Title

Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: A Laboratory Analysis

AuthorsNeugebauer, Tibor; Pezanis-Christou, Paul
KeywordsSequential first-price auctions
Independent private values
Unit-demand
Supply uncertainty
Bidding behavior
Price trends
Experimental economics
Issue Date7-Feb-2003
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
558.03
AbstractWe report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1812
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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