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Title

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

AuthorsKlaus, Bettina
KeywordsMatching
Couples
Random Paths
Responsiveness
Stability
Issue Date1-Dec-2005
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
604.04
AbstractWe study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.
DescriptionTrabajo publicado como artículo en Games and Economic Behavior 58(1): 154-171 (2007).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.002
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1808
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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