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Título

Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities

AutorVeszteg, Róbert Ferenc
Palabras claveAspiration function
Envy-free social choice function
Fairness, implementation
Indivisible goods
Fecha de publicación15-feb-2004
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
613.04
ResumenI analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1796
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