English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1794
Compartir / Impacto:
Estadísticas
Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Ver citas en Google académico
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar otros formatos: Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)
Título

On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

Autor Casari, Marco
Palabras clave Sanctions
Public goods
Cooperation
Experiments
Fecha de publicación 1-jun-2004
Serie UFAE and IAE Working Papers
615.04
ResumenWe discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it confounds the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.
URI http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1794
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
61504.pdf344,8 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.