English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1794
COMPARTIR / IMPACTO:
Estadísticas
logo share SHARE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:
Título

On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

AutorCasari, Marco
Palabras claveSanctions
Public goods
Cooperation
Experiments
Fecha de publicación1-jun-2004
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
615.04
ResumenWe discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it confounds the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1794
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
61504.pdf344,8 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.