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Título : Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples
Autor : Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip
Palabras clave : Student placement
Fairness
Couples
Acyclical priority structuress
Fecha de publicación : 1-mar-2006
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
616.04
Resumen: We study situations of allocating positions to students based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for undergraduate student placement, acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples acyclicity is still necessary, but not sufficient. A second necessary condition is priority-togetherness of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is called pt-acyclic. For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we characterize ptacyclicity and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism. If in addition to pt-acyclicity we require reallocation- and vacancyfairness for couples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement mechanism. Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism. We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation.
Descripción : Trabajo publicado como artículo en International Journal of Game Theory 36(2): 177-207 (2007):-- Open Access.-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0059-9
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1793
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