English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1792
COMPARTIR / IMPACTO:
Estadísticas
logo share SHARE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:
Título

Scoring Rules on Dichotomous Preferences

AutorVorsatz, Marc
Palabras claveApproval Voting
Borda Count
Dichotomous Preferences
Social Choice Function
Fecha de publicación9-ago-2004
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
617.04
ResumenIn this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1792
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
61704.pdf254,52 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.