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Título : Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences
Autor : Vorsatz, Marc
Palabras clave : Approval Voting
Dichotomous Preferences
Social Choice Function
Social Welfare Function
Fecha de publicación : 7-sep-2004
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
619.04
Resumen: The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1790
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