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Título : Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint
Autor : Azacis, Helmuts
Palabras clave : Indivisible goods
Envy-Freeness
Implementation
Strong Nash Equilibrium
Fecha de publicación : 10-sep-2004
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
623.04
Resumen: I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1787
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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