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Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

AutorAzacis, Helmuts
Palabras claveIndivisible goods
Envy-Freeness
Implementation
Strong Nash Equilibrium
Fecha de publicación10-sep-2004
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
623.04
ResumenI consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1787
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