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An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments [Revised Version]

AutorPérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
Palabras claveNon-Transferable utility games
Shapley value
Ordinal Shapley value
Consistency
Fecha de publicación14-dic-2004
EditorElsevier
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
634.04
ResumenWe propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
DescripciónRevised Version of the Paper UFAE and IAE Working Papers nr. 560.03. Published in the Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 127, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 296-308.
Versión del editorhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.007
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1776
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.007
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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