English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1767
COMPARTIR / IMPACTO:
Estadísticas
logo share SHARE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:
Título

Advertising, Brand Loyalty and Pricing

AutorChioveanu, Ioana
Palabras claveOligopoly
Advertising
Price dispersion
Brand loyalty
Fecha de publicación28-ene-2005
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
639.05
ResumenI construct a model in which an oligopoly first invests in persuasive advertising in order to induce brand loyalty to consumers who would otherwise buy the cheapest alternative on the market, and then competes in prices. Despite ex-ante symmetry, at equilibrium, there is one firm which chooses a lower advertising level, while the remaining ones choose the same higher advertising. For the endogenous profile of advertising expenditure, there are a family of pricing equilibria with at least two firms randomizing on prices. The setting offers a way of modelling homogenous product markets where persuasive advertising creates subjective product differentiation and changes the nature of subsequent price competition. The pricing stage of the model can be regarded as a variant of the Model of Sales by Varian (1980) and the two stage game as a way to endogenize consumers heterogeneity raising a robustness question to Varian’s symmetric setting.
DescripciónThis paper is based on my PhD dissertation (Ch. 2) written under the supervision of Xavier Vives.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1767
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
63905.pdf332,58 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.