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http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1761
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Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Brandts, Jordi | - |
dc.contributor.author | Cooper, David J. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-10-31T12:14:39Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2007-10-31T12:14:39Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005-02-18 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1761 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | The authors thank the NSF (SES-0214310), the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (SEC2002-01352), the BBVA Foundation, and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA for financial help. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 643.05 | en_US |
dc.rights | openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Change | en_US |
dc.subject | Incentives | en_US |
dc.subject | Coordination | en_US |
dc.subject | Communication | en_US |
dc.subject | Experiments | en_US |
dc.subject | Organizations | en_US |
dc.title | It's What You Say Not What You Pay | en_US |
dc.type | documento de trabajo | en_US |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 | es_ES |
item.openairetype | documento de trabajo | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
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64305.pdf | 296,29 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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