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Institutions, volatility, and investment

AuthorsBesley, Timothy; Mueller, Hannes
KeywordsForeign investment
Political risk
Executive constraints
Issue Date13-Sep-2016
CitationBecker Friedman Institute Conference (2016)
AbstractCountries with strong executive constraints have lower growth volatility but similar average growth to those with weak constraints. This paper argues that this may explain a strong reduced-form correlation between executive constraints and ináows of foreign investment. It uses a a novel dataset of Dutch sectorlevel investments between 1983 and 2012 to explore this issue. It formulates an economic model of investment and uses data on the mean and variance of productivity growth to explain the relationship between investment ináows and executive constraints. The model can account for the aggregate change in ináows when strong executive constraints are adopted in terms of the reduction in the volatility in productivity growth. The data and model together suggest a natural way of thinking about countryspeciÖc heterogeneity in investment ináows following the adoption of strong executive constraints.
DescriptionTrabajo presentado en la Becker Friedman Institute Conference: Elections, Policymaking, and Economic Uncertainty, celebrada el 13 de septiembre de 2016 en Washington D.C.
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Comunicaciones congresos
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