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Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Ellman, Matthew | es_ES |
dc.contributor.author | Hurkens, Sjaak | es_ES |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-07T08:10:54Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-02-07T08:10:54Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016-01 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series (871): (2016) | es_ES |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/175436 | - |
dc.description | First draft: October 2014 This version: October 2016 | es_ES |
dc.description | Trabajo presentado en el EEA-ESEM: (31 Annual Congress of the European Economic Association & 69th European Meeting of the Econometric Society) celebrado en Genova del 22 al 26 de agosto de 2016.--Trabajo presentado en los Research Seminars de la Universidad de Bologna celebrado el 8 de marzo de 2016 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We characterize optimal reward-based crowdfunding where production is contingent on an aggregate funding threshold. Crowdfunding adapts project implementation to demand (market-testing) and its multiple prices enhance rent-extraction via pivotality, even for large crowds, indeed arbitrarily large if tastes are correlated. Adaptation raises welfare. Rent-extraction can enhance adaptation, but sometimes distorts production and lowers welfare. Threshold commitment, central to AllOr-Nothing platforms, raises profits but can lower consumer welfare. Platforms sometimes promote not-for-profits to raise success rates. When new buyers arrive ex-post, crowdfunding's market-test complements traditional nance and optimizes subsequent pricing. Crowdfunding is a general optimal mechanism in our baseline. | es_ES |
dc.description.sponsorship | Financial support from the Net Institute, http://www.Netinst.org, the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2014-59959, Ellman, and ECO2012-37065, Hurkens) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2014 SGR 510) is gratefully acknowledged. | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Barcelona Graduate School of Economics | es_ES |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/ECO2014–59959-P | es_ES |
dc.relation.isversionof | Publisher's version | es_ES |
dc.rights | openAccess | es_ES |
dc.subject | Crowdfunding | es_ES |
dc.subject | Mechanism design | es_ES |
dc.subject | Entrepreneurial nance | es_ES |
dc.subject | Market-testing | es_ES |
dc.subject | Adaptation | es_ES |
dc.subject | Rent-extraction | es_ES |
dc.title | Optimal crowdfunding design | es_ES |
dc.type | documento de trabajo | es_ES |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer reviewed | es_ES |
dc.relation.publisherversion | https://www.barcelonagse.eu/research/working-papers/optimal-crowdfunding-design | es_ES |
dc.contributor.funder | Net Institute (US) | es_ES |
dc.contributor.funder | Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España) | es_ES |
dc.contributor.funder | Generalitat de Catalunya | es_ES |
dc.relation.csic | Sí | es_ES |
oprm.item.hasRevision | no ko 0 false | * |
dc.identifier.funder | http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002809 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.funder | http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 | es_ES |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 | es_ES |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairetype | documento de trabajo | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
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871_Ellman.pdf | 795,18 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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