English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1742
Compartir / Impacto:
Estadísticas
Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Ver citas en Google académico
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar otros formatos: Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)
Título : (When) Would I Lie To You? Comment on ?Deception: The Role of Consequences?
Autor : Hurkens, Sjaak; Kartik, Navin
Palabras clave : Experimental economics
Lying
Deception
Social preferences
Fecha de publicación : 2-jun-2006
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
664.06
Resumen: This paper reconsiders the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (2005, American Economic Review). We argue that Gneezy's data cannot reject the hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person's decision of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. We find that our data cannot reject this hypothesis either, but we also discover substantial diferences in behavior between our subjects and Gneezy's subjects.
Descripción : Trabajo publicado como artículo con el titulo: "Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion" en Experimental Economics 12(2): 180-192 (2009).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9208-2
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1742
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
66406.pdf211,99 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.