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Título : Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies
Autor : Bervoets, Sebastian; Merlin, Vincent
Palabras clave : Gerrymandering
Manipulation
Two-tiers voting systems
Fecha de publicación : 24-sep-2006
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
669.06
Resumen: This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdiction?s voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1729
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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