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Sincere Voting with Cardinal Preferences: Approval Voting

AutorBallester, Miguel Angel; Rey-Biel, Pedro
Palabras claveSincere and Strategic Voting
Approval Voting
Fecha de publicación15-ene-2007
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
675.07
ResumenWe discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behaviour when conditions to vote strategically vanish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type we show that this optimal behaviour coincides with an intuitive and common definition of sincerity. For voting mechanisms allowing for multiple message types, such as approval voting (AV), there exists no conclusive definition of sincerity in the literature. We show that for AV, voters' optimal strategy tends to one of the existent definitions of sincerity, consisting in voting for those alternatives that yield more than the average of cardinal utilities.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1725
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