English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1723
COMPARTIR / IMPACTO:
Estadísticas
logo share SHARE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:
Título

Inequity Version and Team Incentives

AutorRey-Biel, Pedro
Palabras claveInequity aversion
Team incentives
Behavioral contract theory
Fecha de publicación15-ene-2007
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
677.07
ResumenWe study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1723
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
67707.pdf253,57 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.