English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1711
Compartir / Impacto:
Estadísticas
Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Ver citas en Google académico
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar otros formatos: Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)
Título : Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Autor : Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi
Palabras clave : Secession
Collective action
Independence movements
Laboratory experiments
Rent-Seeking
Fecha de publicación : 1-mar-2007
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
689.07
Resumen: We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1711
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
68907.pdf333,7 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.