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Frames and Games

AutorBrandts, Jordi ; Schwieren, Christiane
Palabras claveFraming
Public goods
Fecha de publicación15-mar-2007
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers
ResumenDecision-makers are sometimes influenced by the way in which choice situations are presented to them or "framed" This can be seen as an important challenge to the social sciences, since strong and pervasive framing effects would make it difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games designed to shed light on the effects of several frame variations. We study, among others, the particular public bad frame used by Andreoni (1995) and two more naturalistic frames involving stories. Our results show that none of the frame manipulations have a significant effect on average behavior, but we do find some effects on extreme behavior. We also find that incentives do matter where frames do not matter.
DescripciónA shorter version of this paper was published as a Chapter of the Book "Developments on Experimental Economics. New Approaches to Solving Real-world Problems", Springer Verlag, 2007, ISBN 978-3-540-68659-0 (Print) 978-3-540-68660-6 (Online), URI: http://www.springerlink.com/content/q24m7306h23485u3/
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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