English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1698
Compartir / Impacto:
Estadísticas
Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Ver citas en Google académico
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar otros formatos: Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)
Título : Personal Relations and their Effect on Behavior in an Organizational Setting: An Experimental Study
Autor : Brandts, Jordi; Solà, Carles
Palabras clave : Family firms
Nepotism
Corporate governance
Procedural fairness
Experiments
Fecha de publicación : 1-dic-2006
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
692.07
Resumen: We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.
Descripción : Trabajo publicado como artículo en Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 73(2): 246-253 (2010).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.005
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1698
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
69207.pdf91,54 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.