English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1691
Compartir / Impacto:
Estadísticas
Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Ver citas en Google académico
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar otros formatos: Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)
Título : Information Networks and Worker Recruitment
Autor : Brandts, Jordi; Schram, Arthur; Gërxhani, Klarita
Palabras clave : Labor Markets
Information Networks
Worker Recruitment
Indirect reciprocity
Experiments
Fecha de publicación : 15-jun-2007
Serie : UFAE and IAE Working Papers
707.07
Resumen: This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1691
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
70707.pdf290,13 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.