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Título

Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences

AutorMassó, Jordi; Nicolò, Antonio
Palabras clavePublic goods
Gregarious Preferences
Subgame Perfect Implementation
Fecha de publicación15-oct-2007
Serie714.07
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
ResumenWe consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1684
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