English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/167439
Share/Impact:
Statistics
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE
Exportar a otros formatos:

Title

Competitive foreclosure

AuthorsBurguet, Roberto ; Sákovics, József
Issue Date13-Nov-2017
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
CitationRAND Journal of Economics 48(4): 906–926 (2017)
AbstractWe model oligopolistic firms, producing substitutes, who compete for inputs from capacity con- strained suppliers in a decentralized market. Compared to a price-taking input market, the incen- tive to foreclose downstream competitors leads to higher input prices and to a higher aggregate amount of input acquired. This novel feature mitigates the output reducing effect of downstream market power and may even restore efficiency in the unique (input) market clearing equilibrium. Other equilibria, where firms coordinate on which suppliers to target, result in excess supply (in- voluntary unemployment, if input is labor) and even higher input prices. Our insights generalize to alternative vertical structures.
Publisher version (URL)https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12206
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/167439
DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12206
ISSN0741-6261
E-ISSN1756-2171
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Burguet_RAND17.pdf359,27 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show full item record
Review this work
 


WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.