English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/167438
Share/Impact:
Statistics
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE
Exportar a otros formatos:

Title

Procurement Design with Corruption

AuthorsBurguet, Roberto CSIC ORCID
KeywordsBribery
Quality
Contract design
Issue DateMay-2017
PublisherAmerican Economic Association
CitationAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9(2): 315-341 (2017)
AbstractI investigate the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After contracting with the sponsor, the contractor may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. The mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I discuss the cases of both fixed and variable (with the size of misrepresentation) bribes, and also uncertainty about the bribe amount. In all cases, the optimal contract curtails quality for low efficiency contractors but also for the most efficient contractors. I also present models of bribe negotiations whose reduced form coincide with the model analyzed in the paper, and discuss implementation and the effect of competition.
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150105
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/167438
DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150105
ISSN1945-7669
E-ISSN1945-7685
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Buguet AEJ_micro-17.pdf221,05 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show full item record
Review this work
 

Related articles:


WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.