English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/167438
COMPARTIR / IMPACTO:
Estadísticas
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:
Título

Procurement Design with Corruption

AutorBurguet, Roberto
Palabras claveBribery
Quality
Contract design
Fecha de publicaciónmay-2017
EditorAmerican Economic Association
CitaciónAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9(2): 315-341 (2017)
ResumenI investigate the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After contracting with the sponsor, the contractor may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. The mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I discuss the cases of both fixed and variable (with the size of misrepresentation) bribes, and also uncertainty about the bribe amount. In all cases, the optimal contract curtails quality for low efficiency contractors but also for the most efficient contractors. I also present models of bribe negotiations whose reduced form coincide with the model analyzed in the paper, and discuss implementation and the effect of competition.
Versión del editorhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150105
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/167438
DOI10.1257/mic.20150105
ISSN1945-7669
1945-7685
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Artículos
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
Buguet AEJ_micro-17.pdf221,05 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.