English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/166747
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE
Exportar a otros formatos:


Non-centralized control for flow-based distribution networks: A game-theoretical insight

AuthorsBarreiro-Gómez, Julian ; Ocampo-Martínez, Carlos ; Quijano, Nicanor; Maestre, Jose Maria
Issue Date2017
CitationJournal of the Franklin Institute 354(14): 5771-5796 (2017)
AbstractThis paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or distributed cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine a proper partitioning of the system and a fair communication cost distribution. On the other hand, a decentralized noncooperative game approach computing the Nash equilibrium is used to achieve the control objective of the resource allocation under a non-complete information topology. Furthermore, an invariant-set property is presented and the closed-loop system stability is analyzed for the non-cooperative game approach. Another contribution regarding the cooperative game approach is an alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the proposed specific characteristic function. Unlike the classical cooperative-games approach, which has a limited application due to the combinatorial explosion issues, the alternative method allows calculating the Shapley value in polynomial time and hence can be applied to large-scale problems.
Publisher version (URL)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfranklin.2017.06.021
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/j.jfranklin.2017.06.021
issn: 0016-0032
Appears in Collections:(IRII) Artículos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
non-flow-game.pdf787,16 kBUnknownView/Open
Show full item record
Review this work

WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.