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Title

Evolutionary Synthesis of Stable Normative Systems

AuthorsMorales, Javier; Wooldridge, Michael; Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio CSIC ORCID ; López-Sánchez, Maite
KeywordsEvolutionary game theory
Normative systems
Norm synthesis
Norms
Evolutionary algorithm
Issue Date8-May-2017
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
CitationProceedings of the16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017: 1646- 1648 (2017)
AbstractNormative systems are a widely used framework to coordi-nate interdependent activities in multi-agent systems. Most research in this area has focused on how to compute norma-tive systems that effectively accomplish a coordination task, as well as additional criteria such as synthesising norms that do not over-regulate a system, and the emergence of norms that remain stable over time. We introduce a framework for the synthesis of stable normative systems that are sufficient and necessary for coordination. Our approach is based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We simulate multi-agent systems in which useful norms are more likely to prosper than useless norms. We empirically show the effectiveness of our approach in a simulated traffic domain. © Copyright 2017, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/164806
Identifiersissn: 15488403
isbn: 978-151085507-6
Appears in Collections:(IIIA) Comunicaciones congresos
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