English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/142799
COMPARTIR / IMPACTO:
Estadísticas
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:
Título

Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment

AutorKlijn, Flip ; Vorsatz, Marc
Palabras claveLaboratory experiment
Game theory
Outsourcing
Social costs
Shortest-first policy
Social preferences
Fecha de publicaciónabr-2017
EditorSpringer
CitaciónTheory and Decision 82(4): 597–615 (2017)
ResumenWe study experimentally in the laboratory two 2-player games that mimic a decentralized decision-making situation in which firms repeatedly outsource production orders to multiple identical suppliers. The first game has a unique (inefficient) equilibrium in mixed strategies, while the second game has two (efficient) equilibria in pure strategies and an infinite number of (inefficient) equilibria in mixed strategies. In both games, the optimal social costs can also be obtained via dominated strategies. We find that only in the second game subjects manage to reach an efficient outcome more often when matched in fixed pairs than when randomly rematched each round. Surprisingly, this is because subjects coordinate on dominated strategies (and not an efficient pure strategy equilibrium). We show theoretically that preferences for efficiency cannot explain our experimental results. Inequality aversion, on the other hand, cannot be rejected.
Versión del editorhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9579-3
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/142799
DOI10.1007/s11238-016-9579-3
ISSN0040-5833
E-ISSN1573-7187
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Artículos
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
Klijn_theory_decion.pdf574,35 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 


NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.