English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/138211
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:

Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists

AuthorsParsons, Simon; Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio ; Klein, Mark
KeywordsAuction theory
Resource allocation
Issue Date2011
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
CitationACM Computing Surveys 43 (2011) art. 10
AbstractThere is a veritable menagerie of auctions-single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid-and these have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this article is to survey this literature from a computer science perspective, primarily from the viewpoint of computer scientists who are interested in learning about auction theory, and to provide pointers into the economics literature for those who want a deeper technical understanding. In addition, since auctions are an increasingly important topic in computer science, we also look at work on auctions from the computer science literature. Overall, our aim is to identifying what both these bodies of work these tell us about creating electronic auctions. © 2011 ACM.
Identifiersdoi: 10.1145/1883612.1883617
issn: 0360-0300
Appears in Collections:(IIIA) Artículos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
ACM_CS_43(2)2011_Art.10.pdf604,05 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record
Review this work

Related articles:

WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.