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Review of Roger F. Gibson, Jr.,Enlightened Empiricism: An Examination of W.V. Quine's Theory of Knowledge

AutorPeña, Lorenzo
Palabras claveGibson
Quine, Willard Van Orman
Condusctismo naturalista
Naturalistic behaviourism
Justificaciones transcendentales
Mentalismo
Naturalistic behaviourism
Transcendental justifications
Perspectivismo
Holismo
Perspectivism
Holism
Fecha de publicación1990
EditorUniversidad del País Vasco
CitaciónTheoria nº 12-13 (1990): 300-02
ResumenAccording to Gibson, Quine's world-view is a naturalistic behaviourism which rejects transcendental justifications, intentions and irreducibly mental entities. Gibson also makes a crisp dichotomy of the ontological and the epistemological stand-points. Gibson's construal depicts Quine's thought as some sort of nonaggregative perspectivism maintaining in effect that what we say is true or not according as whether we are saying it in a particular vein or in a different vein. Gibson says that Quine's philosophy transcends the realist-idealist dichotomy. The reviewer objects that in fact Quine hesitates on the issue of realism and relativism, for some things he maintains commit him to relativism while other ideas he cherishes would rather push him towards realism. If realism is to carry the day, remnants of verificationism must be cast off, which would mean giving up, or at least softening down, indeterminacy of translation and ontological relativity.
DescripciónReseña del libro de Gibson sobre Quine
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/13537
ISSN0495-4548
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