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Title

Logics for Non-Cooperative Games with Expectations

AuthorsGodo, Lluis ; Marchioni, Enrico
KeywordsStrategic choice
Discrete polynomials
Noncooperative game
Payoff function
Complexity results
Issue Date12-Dec-2013
Citation11th European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2013; Toulouse; France; December 12-13, 2013. CEUR Workshop Proceedings, vol. 1113, 2013, pp. 82-96.
AbstractWe introduce the logics E(G) for reasoning about probabilistic expectation over classes G of games with discrete polynomial payoff functions represented by finite-valued Lukasiewicz formulas and provide completeness and complexity results. In addition, we introduce a new class of games where players' expected payoff functions are encoded by E(G)-formulas. In these games each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations over an outcome as well as their own. We offer a logical and computational characterisation of this new class of games.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/133452
Identifiersissn: 16130073
uri: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1113/
Appears in Collections:(IIIA) Comunicaciones congresos
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