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Título

Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations

AutorGodo, Lluis; Marchioni, Enrico
Palabras claveBoolean combinations
Strategic choice
Rational coefficients
Logical representations
Computational methods
Computational studies
Fecha de publicación5-abr-2014
EditorOpen Publishing Association
Citación2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning, SR 2014; Grenoble; France; 5 April 2014 through 6 April 2014; Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS. vol. 146, pp. 9-15, 2014
ResumenWe introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria. © 2014 V. Bruyère, E. Filiot, M. Randour & J.-F. Raskin.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/131901
DOI10.4204/EPTCS.146.2
Identificadoresdoi: 10.4204/EPTCS.146.2
issn: 20752180
Aparece en las colecciones: (IIIA) Comunicaciones congresos
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