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Crafting Consensus

AuthorsZapal, Jan
Keywordsvoting functions
quota voting rule
consensus building
agenda setting power
vote buying
Issue Date22-May-2013
CitationInternal Workshop: Social Choice & Game Theory (2013)
AbstractThe paper analyses the problem of a committee chair using favours at her disposal to maximize the likelihood that her proposal gains committee support. The favours increase the probability of a given member approving the chair’s proposal via a smooth voting function. The decision-making protocol is any quota voting rule. The paper characterizes the optimal allocation of any given level of favours and the optimal expenditure minimizing level of favours. The optimal allocation divides favours uniformly among a coalition of the committee members. At a low level of favours, the coalition comprises all committee members. At a high level, it is the minimum winning coalition. The optimal expenditure level guarantees the chair certain support of the minimum winning coalition if favours are abundant and uncertain support of all committee members if favours are scarce; elitist or egalitarian committees are compatible with a strategic chair. The results are robust to changing the chair’s objectives and to alternative voting functions
DescriptionPresentado el 22 de mayo de 2013 en el Internal Workshop: Social Choice & Game Theory, de la Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica, UAB, Barcelona (España). Presentado el 3 de abril de 2014 en The 2014 Meeting of the European Public Choice Society, celebrado del 3 al 6 de abril de 2014 en Cambridge (Reino Unido)
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Comunicaciones congresos
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